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Turkish Accession to the European Union: 
Shaped by Perception or Reality?
Hannah Q. Young
Bowdoin College
Abstract
Throughout the last fifty years, Turkish-EU relations have fluctuated between positive 
to completely suspended, though one factor has remained consistent: the European Union’s 
hesitation to grant Turkey full membership. While some EU member countries justify bar-
ring Turkey from their ranks for a multitude of institutional, economic, and security reasons, 
similar issues have been overlooked in the past when accepting the membership bids of 
countries such as Spain, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. Why has Turkey in particular faced 
such sustained opposition from EU citizens? Is this opposition based on misinformed per-
ceptions or an actual “clash” of cultures between the EU and Turkey? This project compara-
tively analyzes European public opinion and the “actual” cultural differences between Turkey 
and the EU, as measured by data from European Values Surveys, to conclude that EU citizens’ 
skepticism of Turkish accession is perhaps not very misplaced after all.
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Introduction: The Rise of Public Opinion in the EU
Driven largely by Kemal Ataturk’s vision of Western modernization for his country, 
Turkey first began “knocking” at Europe’s door when it applied for associate membership 
to the European Economic Community in 1959. After nearly five decades and large scale 
political and economic reforms, Turkey finally began formal EU accession negotiations in 
October 2005. As José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, stated, at 
this point, it was now Turkey’s responsibility to “win the hearts and minds of those European 
citizens who are open to, but not convinced of Turkey’s European destiny” (Joseph, 2003, p. 
4).
Since 2005, Turkey’s accession negotiations have progressed slowly and are expected 
to last for at least a decade. As of September 2012, only 13 of the 33 acquis communautaire 
chapters have been opened for negotiation with Turkey. In accord with a 2006 EU Council 
decision, eight negotiation chapters will not be opened and no chapters will be provision-
ally closed until Turkey agrees to recognize the government of the Republic of Cyprus by 
extending the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement to include it. The 
Greek Cypriot government, in response to Turkish refusal to recognize its government, has 
stated its intent to block the opening of another 6 chapters. In alignment with its generally 
hard-line position against Turkish accession, France has also declared that it will block nego-
tiations for five chapters that directly relate to membership.
Furthermore, many news sources consider the EU Commission’s 2012 progress re-
port on Turkey to be “the harshest report” of the 14 released so far and it has been called 
“unbalanced” and too focused on “negative elements” by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (“Turkey Cares Less,” 2012; Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). 
In it, the Commission criticized Turkey particularly on its respect for human rights, its at-
titudes towards the Republic of Cyprus, and the freedom of its media and political ex-
pression, expressing European frustrations with Turkey’s rate of reform. The report’s critical 
tone, especially when coupled with the EU’s recent enlargements and the widespread public 
disapproval of Turkish accession, has led some scholars and politicians to accuse the EU of 
applying “double standards” and “discriminatory practices” to its accession negotiations with 
Turkey and to cite Samuel Huntington’s famous “clash of civilizations” thesis as a means of 
explaining this behavior (Duzgit, 2006, p. 2; Huntington, 1993). 
These accusations aside, what has undoubtedly characterized Turkey’s accession process 
as unique has been the simultaneous development of another, particularly significant, phe-
nomenon amongst EU member states: the rising call in both media and political discourses 
to remedy the EU’s disconnect from the expectations and wants of the European public. De-
scribed by some scholars as the rise of populist backlash “rooted in the perception that ‘the 
people’ are being betrayed by the ruling elites” in Brussels, this movement seeks to close the 
gap between EU political elites and the European public, often through calls for direct pub-
lic involvement in issues such as enlargement (Cuperus, 2009, p. 133; Volten, 2009; Yilmaz, 
2009). Perhaps some of the most evident manifestations of this growing populist sentiment 
in the EU are the rise of both right- and left-wing populist political parties throughout EU 
member states and the French and Dutch publics’ “No” votes on the 2006 Constitutional 
Treaty, which are often interpreted as examples of the public’s reaction to “an increasingly 
elitist EU project” (Duzgit, 2007, p. 19). 
In the wake of 2006’s showing of frustration with EU elitism, France and Austria have 
led arguments against Turkish membership on the basis of public opinion. In October 2004, 
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French President Jacques Chirac introduced his wish for compulsory referenda in France for 
future EU enlargements. The issue was revisited in 2008 under the Sarkozy administration 
when it announced its intent to amend the French Constitution in a way that would require 
a referendum on EU enlargement if the candidate in question held a population greater than 
5% of the EU’s total population. While the French Senate ultimately rejected this amend-
ment, during the 2008 legislative election campaign in Austria, coalition parties did agree to 
hold a national referendum should Turkey’s accession negotiations be completed. This senti-
ment was echoed in 2011 by Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann, who stated that, “even 
in the case of a positive decision after negotiations…we will organise a referendum in Austria 
on this topic” (“Austria Mulls,” 2011). 
The looming threat of referenda in both France and Austria and the arguments that 
Brussels continues to make EU-wide decisions without the engagement of the European 
public has led to rising pressure on politicians to not ignore their citizens’ wishes in regards 
to EU policy. In 2006, the European Commission added a new section to its enlargement 
section in its regular Eurobarometer surveys, “The question of Turkey,” possibly in an at-
tempt to better gauge and react to public opinion towards Turkey and its accession. With 
this introduction of public opinion as a more salient factor of consideration when evaluating 
enlargement policy, understanding the EU’s attitude towards Turkish accession has become 
decidedly more complex. No longer exclusively an exercise of elite decision-making, the 
issue of Turkish enlargement is now influenced by EU citizens’ perceptions and sentiments. 
Understanding Public Opinion in the EU
As such, a comprehensive understanding of public opinion regarding Turkish EU 
membership and how it is formed is needed in order to understand the complexities of Tur-
key’s accession. Data and analysis from various Eurobarometer reports will be employed to 
analyze European Union-wide opinion trends regarding Turkey’s accession. Eurobarometer 
surveys are conducted in two waves per year and consist of approximately 1,000 face-to-face 
interviews of persons over fifteen years of age in each existing EU member state (this num-
ber varies from 503 interviewees in Cyprus to 1,526 in Germany). This paper’s analysis will 
be limited to citizens in the current 27 EU member states, given that their opinions are the 
relevant ones in regards to future enlargement policy.
A survey conducted by the Center for European Studies of Boğaziçi University in 
Istanbul in partnership with the Autonomous University of Madrid and the University of 
Granada under the coordination of Professor Hakan Yilmaz is also used to provide infor-
mation on trends in wider European attitudes towards Turkey. This survey, conducted in 
September 2009, samples 5000+ respondents from France, Germany, Poland, Spain and the 
United Kingdom on the Turkish question in “manifold dimensions.” Although it does not 
collect data from all EU-27 Member States, the five countries sampled present varying and 
conflicting outlooks on Turkey that are largely representative of the EU-wide debate on 
Turkey. 
According to Eurobarometer opinion polls from 1992 to 2008, public support for 
Turkish accession is not only low, but it is also declining (See Appendix 1). The variable used 
to measure EU citizens’ support for Turkish membership is the following question, presented 
in various Eurobarometer reports from 1992 to 2008: “For each of the following countries, 
would you be in favour or against it becoming part of the European Union in the future?” 
Respondents could respond with either “in favour,” “against,” or “don’t know.”
Turkish Accession to the European Union: Shaped by Perception or
Hannah Young Bowdoin College146
Support peaked in December 1992 with 41% of EU citizens backing Turkish mem-
bership, but it steadily dropped to just 31% by April 2008. From 2000 onwards, support 
for Turkish membership has remained relatively constant, if somewhat declining, varying 
between 28% to 35% of EU citizens. The share of contesters, on the other hand, has steadily 
risen from 47% in 2000 to 55% in 2008, suggesting that many “don’t know” respondents 
have switched to the opposition view over the last decade.
When comparing these attitudes towards Turkish membership with those towards oth-
er countries, it is clear that not only is support for Turkey’s membership relatively low but 
that it cannot be attributed to general “enlargement fatigue.” EU support for Icelandic, Swiss, 
and Norwegian membership at this same time (2008), for example, was very high, with 71%, 
77%, and 78% of Europeans supporting the accession of these countries respectively. Even 
Balkan countries, such as Croatia (52%) and Macedonia (40%), and Ukraine (43%) enjoyed 
higher levels of support for membership than Turkey.
Of further note, 2008 support for Turkey’s membership was far from uniform between 
EU member states (See Appendix 2). Austria, the Republic of Cyprus, and Germany ex-
pressed the least amount of support for Turkish accession, with only 7%, 11% and 16% of 
their citizens backing the candidate member state respectively. Luxembourg, France, Greece, 
and Italy are also amongst Turkey’s least supportive critics. On the opposite end of the spec-
trum, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain have the highest levels of support, with 61%, 49%, and 
46% of their populations supporting Turkey’s membership bid.
While these Eurobarometer figures definitely show that EU citizens have weak and 
diminishing support for Turkey as future member state, it does not specifically depict how 
Europeans perceive Turkey, other than as incompatible with the EU. A more detailed set of 
questions about Turkey that first appeared on a Eurobarometer survey in 2006, however, pro-
vides greater insight into exactly how Europeans view Turkey. First seen in Eurobarometer 
64.2 (fieldwork done in 2005), relevant questions that the EC posed to EU citizens included:
QA45. For each of the following please tell me whether you totally agree, tend to 
agree, tend to disagree or totally disagree:
•	 Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography 
•	 Turkey Partly belongs to Europe by its history 
•	 Turkey’s accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region
•	 Turkey’s accession to the EU would favour the mutual comprehension of Euro-
pean and Muslim values
•	 The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too sig-
nificant to allow for this accession 
•	 Turkey’s accession would favour the rejuvenation of an ageing European popula-
tion 
•	 Turkey’s joining could risk favouring immigration to more developed countries 
in the EU
•	 To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to respect systematically Hu-
man Rights
•	 To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the 
state of its economy 
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In 2006, 54% of EU citizens agreed that Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geogra-
phy and only 40% agreed that Turkey belonged to Europe on the basis of its history. In 2007, 
these figures both rose to 56% and 41% respectively, showing that a majority of EU citizens 
support Turkey’s place in Europe on a geographical basis but not based on its history. A mi-
nority of EU citizens believed that Turkey’s accession to the EU would help improve secu-
rity in this region in 2006 and 2007, with only 35% and 36% of citizens answering positively 
to this question. The consensus was also negative regarding the question of whether Turkey’s 
accession would favor the comprehension of European and Muslim values, with only 38% 
and 37% of EU citizens answering believing this statement to be true in 2006 and 2007 
respectively. In fact, a majority of EU citizens believe that the cultural difference between 
Turkey and the EU member states are too significant to allow for its accession. 55% of EU 
citizens expressed this belief in 2006 and this number increased to 61% by 2007. There was 
little division among EU member states in regards to the view that Turkey’s accession would 
not be very important for the rejuvenation of the EU’s population either, but a definite 
majority of EU citizens do believe that Turkey’s accession would risk favoring immigration 
to more developed EU member states, with 63% and 66% of Europeans expressing this fear 
in 2006 and 2007 respectively. Finally, almost all EU citizens, 83% in 2006 and 85% in 2007, 
agree that Turkey will have to systematically improve its respect of human rights and signifi-
cantly improve its economy, 76% in 2006 and 77% in 2007, before it can accede (European 
Commission, 2006, 2007).
These trends suggest that, broadly speaking, Europeans have trouble seeing Turkey as 
culturally compatible with the European Union. EU citizens do not believe that Turkish 
accession would have a positive effect on cultural understanding, widely believe that Turkey 
is actually too incompatible with the EU culturally to become a member, believe Turkey’s 
history places it outside of Europe, and believe it does not meet the economic and human 
rights standards required of EU members. 
In general, these perceptions of Turkey can be divided into three main levels of analysis: 
the post-modern evaluation of Turkey’s ability to uphold the liberal democratic principles 
of the EU, the utilitarian analysis of Turkey’s material costs and benefits to the EU, and the 
cultural interpretation of Turkey’s “Europeanness,” As Antonia Ruiz-Jimenez and Jose I. Tor-
reblanca summarize in their publication, “European Public Opinion and Turkey’s Accession: 
Making Sense of Arguments For and Against” (2007), these three perspectives from which 
EU citizens generally interpret Turkish accession can be defined as “attitudinal dimensions.” 
From the post-national outlook, the EU is understood as supranational organization 
built upon the universal liberal-democratic values outlined in its founding treaty: “human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights…plu-
ralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and 
men” (Treaty on European Union, 1992). Thus, from this outlook, accession is evaluated on 
the assumption that enlargement should be determined by a candidate’s adherence to these 
universal principles. In contrast, when evaluated with an instrumental outlook, materially 
measurable costs and benefits (i.e. economic, security, immigration, budgetary, institutional) 
of Turkish membership are rationally weighed in order to present whether Turkish accession 
would be beneficial or detrimental to the EU. Finally, from an identitarian outlook, the EU 
is understood as a defined community united by common values, culture, identity, and tradi-
tions. From this view, EU citizens’ attitudes towards accession are shaped by the perceived 
cultural and identity compatibility between applicant states and the EU.
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After categorizing each Eurobarometer 64.2 (2005) question regarding Turkey’s ac-
cession by which of the three attitudinal dimensions to which it appeals, Ruiz-Jiminez and 
Torreblanca calculate the degree to which each attitudinal dimension influences the forma-
tion of EU citizens’ perceptions of Turkey by using a statistically significant scale. With 1 
being the least important and 5 being the most important, in the EU-25 the identitarian 
outlook appears to most strongly impact EU citizens’ sentiment towards Turkish accession, 
with an average significance of 3.1. Utilitarian considerations are the next most influential 
on how Europeans form their judgments on Turkish membership with an average of 2.9, 
and the post-national outlook is the least significant, with a mean of 2.7 (Ruiz-Jimenez & 
Torreblanca, 2007, p. 10).
This data indicates that EU citizens’ outlooks on Turkish membership are “more likely 
to be based on elements connected with culture, history and geography than with costs/
benefits or universal principles such as democracy and human rights” (Ruiz-Jimenez & Tor-
reblanca, 2007, p. 11). However, while issues about identity and culture are most strongly 
correlated to shaping public opinion about Turkish accession, it is a post-national under-
standing of the European Union as a community based on universal and democratic rights 
that is most strongly connected to generating support for Turkish accession. This helps ex-
plain why public support for Turkey’s accession is so low: on average, the outlook most likely 
to inspire support for Turkish membership is the least-important attitudinal dimension in 
actually shaping Europeans’ perceptions of Turkey’s accession while the attitudinal dimension 
least likely to inspire support is the strongest.
This conclusion is also supported by survey results from the Civil Society Dialogue 
Between EU and Turkey University Grant Scheme taken in 2009. According to this survey 
conducted under Professor Hakan Yilmaz, 40% of survey respondents agree that mostly 
cultural factors influence their attitudes towards Turkey, while only 27% said economic and 
26% said political factors influenced their attitudes towards Turkey. For those citizens who 
opposed Turkish membership, the influence of cultural factors was even greater, with 45.6% 
of respondents saying that cultural factors influenced their negative attitude towards Turkish 
accession (Yilmaz, 2009). 
Yilmaz’s survey also reveals that 38.9% of European respondents found the statement, 
“culturally speaking, Turkey is a Muslim country…not compatible with the common Chris-
tian roots,” to be a compelling argument against Turkish accession. For those respondents 
opposed to Turkish membership, 51.5% found this argument the most influential. The fact 
that this question emphasizes the Muslim and Christian traditions of these two societies as 
culturally relevant suggests that 38.9% of Europeans identify Turkey as incompatible with the 
EU based on religious differences. 
Unlike the Eurobarometer, which leaves “cultural differences” undefined, Yilmaz’s sur-
vey also offers some insight into the factors that may shape European respondents’ defini-
tion of “culture” by posing questions regarding respondents’ opinions on Turk’s family ties, 
respect for the elderly, individualism, respect for the rights of others, tolerance, rationality, 
peacefulness and reasonableness, cleanliness, and sexual freedom.. In general, respondents 
interestingly reported their belief that these elements are relatively similar in Turkish and 
European society. 
While a third of respondents believe that Turks and Europeans have equally strong 
family ties, 46.5% reported the belief that Turkish society is more strongly characterized by 
strong family ties. In terms of peacefulness, reasonableness, and sexual freedom, however, most 
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survey respondents believe that Europeans more strongly exhibit these traits. On the other 
hand, most respondents perceive that Europeans and Turks equally exhibit individualism, 
respect of the rights of others and of the elderly, tolerance, rationality, and cleanliness. This 
is interesting because it suggests that when confronted with specific cultural characteristics, 
EU citizens largely do not identify Turkey as being radically different from their society. This 
indicates that EU citizens’ relatively positive perceptions of specific cultural factors in Turkey 
are independent from the formation of their negative conceptions of Turkey’s cultural com-
patibility with the EU, suggesting that perhaps many EU citizens do not consider specific 
societal characteristics when evaluating “cultural” compatibility between Turkey and the EU, 
but instead rely on a more abstract, and perhaps unquantifiable, conception of “culture.”
The societal characteristics widely seen by Europeans as common to both societies 
also happen to be largely post-modern in orientation, incorporating universal liberal val-
ues such as tolerance and respect. Given that these types of factors have the least sway over 
peoples’ perception of Turkey’s accession process, this trend suggests that even though most 
respondents’ view the two societies as compatibly manifesting these characteristics, it does 
not particularly sway their opinions towards Turkish membership and helps explain why so 
much opposition is still found across the EU.
Yilmaz also asks an interesting question regarding the values that respondents associ-
ate with “European Identity” on his survey. While this does not directly reveal how survey 
respondents regard Turkey, if these values represent European identity, many survey respon-
dents may perceive Turkish society as incompatible with these values given that both this 
survey and Eurobarometer data show that EU citizens widely believe Turkey is incompatible 
with the EU due to its cultural identity. Of the values respondents associated with European 
identity, the four most cited were “Democracy and Human Rights” (43.3%), “economic 
development and social welfare” (42.2%), “tolerance for different points of view and ways of 
life” (21%), and “equality between men and women” (20.6%). Thus, a major factor driving 
opposition towards Turkish accession may be the perception that Turkey is largely incompat-
ible with these fundamental values associated with European identity. 
In summary, while all the data regarding EU citizens’ perceptions of Turkey illustrates 
great variation amongst member states, it also illustrates some EU-level trends in public 
opinion. First, support for Turkish accession is low relative to other candidate countries and 
former candidate countries. This support has also largely been on the decline for the last 
decade. When more closely examined, European perceptions of Turkish accession appear to 
be most strongly shaped by cultural and identity-based factors and are the least influenced by 
post-modern considerations. Given that post-modern understandings of the EU and acces-
sion process are the most likely to generate support for Turkish membership, the widespread 
opposition to Turkey’s membership bid is partially explained by the fact that this outlook 
is the least significant in shaping opinions towards Turkish accession overall. Yilmaz’s survey 
results give some indication of what identity-based characteristics EU citizens perceive as 
particularly incompatible with Turkish society, such as Europe’s greater levels of sexual free-
dom , peacefulness, reasonableness, its standards of democracy and human rights, economic 
development and social welfare, tolerance for different points of view and ways of life, and 
equality between men and women.
Perceptions or Reality?
Given the growing significance of European public opinion in shaping EU policy and 
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that EU citizens’ opinions about Turkey are largely based on how they perceive Turkey’s cul-
ture and whether or not it is seen as being compatible with the EU’s, “fundamental cultural 
differences” between Turkey and the EU are of “decisive importance,” as former German 
Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, observed (Dixon, 2008, p. 682). However, do perceptions of 
cultural difference guarantee that differences actually exist between these two societies? Or 
are these perceptions rooted in misperceptions and stereotypes held by EU citizens about 
Turkish society? If EU perceptions of Turkey’s culture are based on actual differences be-
tween Turkish and EU societies, Turkey may still have an opportunity to alter EU public 
opinion regarding its membership by reforming its society to align more closely with EU 
values or by changing how information about Turkey is conveyed to EU citizens. If EU 
perceptions of Turkish culture do not align with actual differences between the two societies 
but are shaped by intangible factors, then it is unclear how precisely Turkey can influence 
European public opinion regarding its accession.
In order to evaluate if the perceptions of EU citizens discussed above are founded in 
real differences between Turkish and European societies, Turkish and EU member states’ 
aggregate responses to the 1999 and 2008 waves of the European Values Survey will be 
compared to illustrate differences in values held by each group of citizens. As a control for 
determining whether the values measured in Turkey and the EU are relatively similar or 
divergent, the values of EU member states with traditions of Orthodox Christianity will also 
be measured separately. These member states, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece, are specified 
by Huntington as being part of the “Orthodox” civilization, which is more like the “West-
ern” civilization that the EU is largely comprised of than the “Islamic” civilization that Tur-
key straddles (Huntington, 1993, p. 30). This is simply one example of a control that could 
be used to better compare Turkish and EU data results, but one that is often cited by scholars 
and conveniently also questions Huntington’s widely debated civilization thesis. Since these 
three Orthodox states have already successfully completed the accession process and are EU 
member states, the value differences exhibited between them and the whole EU must pres-
ent a level of value differentiation that still allows for the degree of cultural compatibility 
needed to join the EU. Thus, if Turkey’s values are relatively similar to those of the Orthodox 
citizens, it can be assumed that Turkey does not differ too drastically on these values to deny 
compatibility with the EU. 
Drawing upon various scholars’ definitions of “culture” (Yilmaz, 2008; Huntington, 
1993; Weber, 1922; McLaren, 2007; Nugent, 2007) and the values outlined in the guiding 
principles of the Treaty on European Union, questions from the European Value Surveys 
(EVS) will investigate political values, religious values, tolerance values, and values regarding 
gender equality as outlined in Table 1. 
For the sake of brevity, the results from this EVS analysis will be summarized and data 
will be confined to the Appendix section (see Appendixes 3-16). 
Politically, Turkish citizens appear to evaluate democracy very similarly to those of 
the EU, particularly in an abstract context, but have a greater acceptance for authoritar-
ian values. Given their strong degree of support for democracy, Turks’ tendency to support 
authoritarian values may merely reflect a more conservative populace than the EU average 
or its history of military defense of secularism, suggesting that its affinity for authoritarian 
values may be insignificant. Furthermore, Turkey seems only relatively more authoritar-
ian than Orthodox member states, also suggesting that its greater support for authoritarian 
values is not entirely incompatible with the EU. The similarities between Turkish and EU 
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values regarding democracy are particularly notable since, as evidenced by Yilmaz’s survey 
data above, “Democracy and Human Rights” is considered a fundamental value associated 
with European identity by 43.3% of European survey respondents, suggesting the similarity 
in these particular values is highly significant. 
Table 1. Question wording and span of value factors for EU member states and 
Turkey: European Values Survey (1999-2008)
Value Factor Question Wording
Political Values
Abstract evaluations 
of Democracy
Q: Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or 
disagree strongly? Democracies have many problems but it’s better 
than any other form of government.
Q: Would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very 
bad way of governing this country? Having a democratic political 
system.
Specific evaluations 
of Democracy
Q: Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or 
disagree strongly? Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order.
Q: Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or 
disagree strongly? In democracy, the economic system runs badly
Authoritarian Values
Q: Would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very 
bad way of governing this country? Having the army rule
Q: Would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very 
bad way of governing this country? Having a strong leader who 
does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
Religious Values
Q: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the follow-
ing? Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public 
office.
Q: How much do you agree or disagree with each of the follow-
ing statements: Religious leaders should not influence government 
decisions.
Q: Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how of-
ten do you attend religious services these days?”
Tolerance
Q: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort 
out any that you would not like to have as neighbors. Immigrants/
foreign workers
Q: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort 
out any that you would not like to have as neighbors. People of a 
different race.
Gender Relations
Q: For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell me 
how much you agree with each. Having a job is the best way for a 
woman to be an independent person.
Q: Do you agree or disagree with the following statement. When 
jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women.
Q: For each of the following statements I read out, can you tell 
me how much you agree with each. A job is alright but what most 
women really want is a home and children
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In terms of religious values, there are a higher percent of citizens who are religiously 
active in Turkey, but a relatively similar proportion of citizens in both Turkish and EU so-
ciety who are practically never religiously active. This suggests that, aggregately, religious 
values are more prevalent in the Turkish population than in that of the EU and that religion 
plays a greater role in everyday life in Turkey, similar to trends found in Orthodox society. 
This higher level of religiosity in Turkey supports the fact that Turkish citizens are also sig-
nificantly more likely to consider belief in God as important in political leaders than EU 
citizens, suggesting a higher tolerance for indirect religious political rule. However, Turks 
and Europeans exhibited very similar levels of support for religious leaders influencing gov-
ernment decisions, suggesting relatively similar degrees of intolerance for religious political 
rule and desire for secularism in both societies. Overall, however, it appears that Turkey can 
be considered to maintain relatively more religious values than the EU, illustrating a fairly 
perceptible difference between the values held by each society. 
Combined trends from EVS questions regarding tolerance suggest that Turkish citizens 
have less tolerant values towards minority groups than both EU and Orthodox citizens, an 
extremely significant cultural divide between the two societies given that the EU is com-
munity comprised of many different ethnic groups, supports free internal immigration, and 
specifically outlines “tolerance” as a founding principle of the Union in the TEU. Further-
more, as reported in Yilmaz’s survey, “tolerance for different points of view and ways of life” 
is a value that 21% of surveyed Europeans associate with European identity, suggesting that 
the divergence in this value has particular weight.
In regards to gender relations, Turkish citizens appear more likely to believe that a 
woman’s place in society is in a maternal capacity or the home (they also believe that women 
prefer this) while EU and Orthodox citizens see women as warranting greater independence 
and preferring the workplace. The size of the divergence between Turkish and both EU and 
Orthodox citizens’ gender relation values is drastic, illustrating a true divide in the opinions 
about gender relations between these two societies. As demonstrated earlier by Yilmaz’s sur-
vey data, Turkey’s more “traditional” view of women is particularly notable since “equality 
between men and women” is often considered a defining feature of European identity. 
Exaggerated Differences: The Results of a Populist Movement?
Analysis of EVS 1999 and 2008 wave data indicates that Turkish and EU citizens have 
very similar values regarding democracy, in both an abstract and specific context. However, 
Turkish citizens express more authoritarian and religious values than EU citizens and are less 
likely to express tolerance towards minority groups or value gender equality. This suggests 
that actual cultural differences do exist between Turkey and the EU, most certainly in regards 
to tolerance and gender relations and to a lesser extent in regards to religion’s influence on 
government. On the other hand, Turkey and the EU appear perfectly compatible in regards 
to their views towards democracy. How does this compare to EU citizens’ perceptions of 
Turkey?
EU citizens seem clearly aware of the divergence between their own and Turkey’s views 
towards tolerance and gender relations. EU citizens’ unanimously agree that Turkey must 
improve its respect for human rights before its accession can be accepted and are relatively 
skeptical about whether Turkey’s citizens value tolerance to the same extent as they do. This 
perception is evident in the rhetoric found across the EU concerning Turkish treatment of 
the Kurds and fears about Turkey’s (and Islam’s) repression of women. 
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EU citizens also seem to perceive that Turkish citizens possess more authoritarian and 
stronger religious values than Europeans, but perhaps to a greater extent than is true. Au-
thoritarianism, which indicates a willingness to sacrifice personal freedom and individualism 
for order and obedience, is measured by peoples’ support for despotic means of governance 
in this study. Turks are admittedly far more supportive of military rule than Europeans, but 
also have a unique history in regards to military rule, which suggests this may not be illus-
trative of just authoritarianism in Turkish society. This is particularly true given that Turkish 
support for a strong leader who doesn’t have to deal with parliament is at the same levels 
found in Orthodox EU member states, indicating that their authoritarian values may not be 
so far from those found in the EU. 39.5% of EU citizens, however, perceive that Europeans 
are more individualistic than Turks, while only 7.6% of Europeans see Turks as being more 
individualistic than Europeans (Yilmaz, 2009). This perception that Turks are more authori-
tarian than EU citizens is perhaps a bit exaggerated, given that Turkey is no more authoritar-
ian than several of existing EU member states.
Furthermore, as illustrated, 38.9% of Yilmaz’s EU survey respondents expressed the 
perception that Turkey’s Muslim values make it incompatible with the “common Christian 
roots” of the EU (Yilmaz, 2009). This suggests that not only do 38.9% of European citizens 
perceive their Christian roots as powerful enough to culturally define the EU, but that Tur-
key’s identity as a “Muslim country” is a leading factor in its incompatibility with the EU. 
In reality, a third of EU citizens report that they never attend religious services, only 20% 
of Europeans attend religious services at least once a week or more, and citizens across the 
EU unanimously support secular governance, suggesting that religiosity is not a significantly 
important factor in most Europeans’ lives or identities. Furthermore, while Turkey is indeed 
99.8% Muslim, 27% of Turks report being religiously inactive (only 5% fewer than in the 
EU) and Turks also show a strong commitment to secular governance (EVS, 2008). This sug-
gests that Turkey’s religiosity is not completely incompatible with that of the EU, given that 
both support secular societies and the EU is grounded upon the separation of church and 
state and religious freedom. 
Doubts about Turkey’s compatibility with the democratic values of the EU are perhaps 
the most flawed perceptions that EU citizens possess about Turkish culture. Turkish citizens 
express relatively equal, at times greater, support for democratic values relative to EU citi-
zens. As seen in data from Yilmaz’s survey, 43.3% of Europeans associate “Democracy and 
Human Rights” with European identity, the most cited value given. Since EU citizens also 
consistently reject Turkey’s compatibility with EU identity, identity considerations being 
least strongly correlated with EU support for Turkish accession, many EU citizens must see 
Turkey as being incompatible with European views on “Democracy and Human Rights” 
since this value is so strongly associated with EU identity. As evidenced by the strong Turkish 
support for democratic values, this perception is clearly misguided.
Ultimately, EU citizens appear perhaps slightly overly pessimistic about the cultural in-
compatibility of Turkey and the EU. While Europeans perceptions of Turkey as significantly 
less tolerant than EU society would allow are relatively accurate, EU citizens appear to often 
overstate the differences between EU and Turkish levels of authoritarianism and religiosity 
and entirely misunderstand Turkish citizens’ commitment to democratic values. 
Much of the gap between Europeans’ perceptions of Turkey and the realities of Turkish 
society can likely be explained by EU citizens’ lack of knowledge about Turkish culture and 
the persuasive and culturally based arguments employed by a growing number of populist-
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like, extremist political parties across Europe.
According to Yilmaz’s survey, 50% of European respondents report being “not in-
formed” in regards to their subjective information level about Turkey (2009) and a 2006 
Eurobarometer report measured that 68% of EU citizens do not feel well informed about 
economic ramifications of enlargement (European Commission, 2006). This self-reported 
lack of knowledge about Turkey is an obvious indicator that many of the perceptions held 
by EU citizens in regards to Turkish accession may be founded on lack of understanding. 
In addition to this general lack of knowledge about the Turkish accession process and 
Turkish society in general, EU citizens’ sources of information suggest that Europeans are 
not being exposed to a balanced and informed debate about the merits and drawbacks of 
Turkish accession. 71.3% of EU citizens report getting information about Turkish accession 
via “news and commentaries on the television and radio” and 55.9% report “news com-
mentaries in the newspapers and magazines” (Yilmaz, 2009). This means that a large por-
tion of Europeans get their information about Turkish accession from the European media, 
which “on the whole tends to paint a rather negative image of Turkey” (Tocci, 2008, p. 267). 
At its worst, driven by commercial logic, the European media largely reports “stereotypes, 
sensationalism, and alarmism” in regards to Turkey in an attempt to sell their products (Tocci 
2008, p. 267). Less dramatically, media from across the EU tends towards the “culturalizing” 
of political issues regarding Turkey and report about Turkey’s EU accession in the context 
of Islam, “focusing on tragic incidents or crises, and linking these back to the depiction of 
Turkey as the unknown ‘other’ and its inability to conform to ‘European standards of civiliza-
tion’” (Tocci, 2008, p. 268). 
This tendency of the European media to appeal to stereotypes and cultural focuses 
when reporting about Turkey is particularly influential in shaping EU citizens’ support for 
Turkey’s membership bid given that identity-based arguments are the most likely to in-
fluence public opinion regarding Turkish accession, and the least likely to inspire support. 
This means that the cultural and sensational information frequently disseminated to a large 
proportion of EU citizens is more likely to impact their views on Turkey than, for example, 
scholarly articles which present post-national and instrumental arguments for or against 
Turkish accession.
Identity-based arguments that strongly impact EU citizens’ opinions towards Turkey are 
also employed by a growing number of far-right, populist-like political parties across the EU. 
Far-right parties in every member state examined tend to resolutely oppose Turkish acces-
sion, generally on the grounds of religious and cultural differences. Subsequently, anti-Turkey 
political rhetoric can be found across the EU, from extreme parties such as the Lega Nord in 
Italy, the FPO in Austria, the Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, the Mouvement pour la France, 
the Law & Justice in Poland, and LAOS in Greece (Tocci, 2008, p. 266). Given that 30.7% of 
EU citizens report getting information about Turkey from their political leaders, the identity 
and culturally based arguments coming from these radical parties find a relatively significant 
audience and are particularly effective in fueling opposition towards Turkish accession given 
the salient nature of culturally and identity-based arguments (Yilmaz, 2009). 
Conclusion
Across Europe, growing disenchantment with the elite driven decision-making process 
of the European Union has led to calls for the engagement of the EU public. Populist-like 
parties have sprung up across EU member states and greater attention is beginning to be 
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paid to public opinion on issues like EU enlargement. In tandem with this growing atten-
tion to mass opinion, Turkey’s bid for EU membership has seen low and declining support 
from European citizens. Perceived as culturally incompatible with Europe, Turkey has been 
labeled an outsider by many EU citizens, suggesting that Huntington’s predicted “clash of 
civilizations” could in fact be true. 
However, when the values held by Europeans and Turks are analyzed through Europe-
an Values Surveys, it is clear that a highly disruptive cultural divide between the two societies 
does not exist across the board, but that certain cultural differences have been dramatized and 
have led to the common misperception that Turkey’s cultural values are irreconcilable with 
European civilization. This widespread misperception can be easily traced to the general lack 
of knowledge that EU citizens seem to have about Turkish society and the EU enlargement 
process. Identity-based rhetoric from far-right political parties across Europe and the “cul-
turalizing” of news from European media sources further distort EU citizens’ understanding 
of Turkish society and its accession process. 
The more the debate on Turkish accession is driven by these identity-based arguments, 
the more likely it is that European public support for Turkey’s EU membership will decline. 
As long as right-wing parties control the debate over Turkish accession and European me-
dia presents biased reports of Turkey, EU citizens will likely remain misinformed about and 
negative towards Turkey. In order for Turkey’s EU membership to gain citizen support in 
the EU, accurate information about Turkey must be circulated and a balanced debate over 
Turkish accession must be facilitated, where post-nationalist and instrumental arguments are 
discussed and not overshadowed by identity and cultural concerns. 
Author's Notes
This paper represents an abridged discussion of a larger research thesis I completed under the 
guidance of Professor Laura Henry at Bowdoin College: “Turkey and the European Union: 
A Clash of Misconceptions?”
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Appendices
Appendix 1. EU Member State Support for Turkish Accession
Data source: European Commission. “Eurobarometer 37-70.” Standard Eurobarometer (1992-2008). http://ec.europa.
eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm
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Appendix 2. Support for Turkish Membership by EU Member State in April 2008
Data source: European Commission. “Eurobarometer 69.” Standard Eurobarometer (2008). http://ec.europa.eu/pub-
lic_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm
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Appendix 3. Percentage of EU citizens who mentioned that they wouldn’t like to 
have “people of a different race” for neighbors.
1999 2008
EU 9.3 13.3
Turkey 33.9 42.7
Orthodox 21.8 17.4
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 4. Percentage of EU citizens who mentioned that they wouldn’t like to 
have “immigrants/foreign workers” for neighbors.
1999 2008
EU 9.8 17.1
Turkey 45.4 48.7
Orthodox 19.4 18.1
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 5. Percentage of EU citizens who sees “having a strong leader who 
doesn’t have to deal with parliament or elections” as “very good” or “fairly good.”
1999 2008
EU 24.6 30.5
Turkey 66.1 61.6
Orthodox 40.1 60.9
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 6. Percentage of EU citizens who sees “having the army rule the coun-
try” as “very good” or “fairly good.”
1999 2008
EU 5.1 7.9
Turkey 24.7 33.2
Orthodox 16.3 14.2
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 7. Percentage of EU citizens who sees “having a democratic political 
system” as “very good” or “fairly good.”
1999 2008
EU 93.2 89.3
Turkey 91.7 90.1
Orthodox 91.2 91.2
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
159
Turkish Accession to the European Union: Shaped by Perception or
Appendix 8. Percentage of EU citizens who “agrees strongly” or “agrees” that 
“democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of govern-
ment.”
1999 2008
EU 93.2 91.5
Turkey 87.9 92.9
Orthodox 86.4 88.9
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 9. Percentage of EU citizens who “agrees strongly” or “agrees” that 
“Democracies aren’t good at maintaining order.”
1999 2008
EU 25.3 33.3
Turkey 32.7 38.3
Orthodox 39.0 46.5
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 10. Percentage of EU citizens who “agrees strongly” or “agrees” that 
“Economic systems run badly in democracies.”
1999 2008
EU 24.8 33.6
Turkey 30.1 35.6
Orthodox 45.2 51.0
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 11. Percentage of EU citizens who “agrees strongly” or “agrees” that 
“Politicians who don’t believe in God are unfit for office.”
1999 2008
EU 12.1 18.2
Turkey 62.3 66.2
Orthodox 38.1 40.3
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 12. Percentage of EU citizens who “agrees strongly” or “agrees” that 
“Religious leaders should not influence government decisions.”
1999 2008
EU 70.4 64.2
Turkey 72.3 63.4
Orthodox 72.6 68.3
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
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Appendix 13. Percentage of EU citizens who “agree” that “When jobs are scarce, 
men have more right to a job than women.”
1999 2008
EU 19.3 18.8
Turkey 61.8 60.0
Orthodox 31.5 27.8
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 14. Percentage of EU citizens who attend religious services “never, 
practically never.”
1999 2008
EU 32.7 31.6
Turkey 32.3 27.1
Orthodox 12.7 11.7
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 15. Percentage of EU citizens who attend religious services “more than 
once a week” or “once a week.”
1999 2008
EU 20.2 19.9
Turkey 39.1 34.1
Orthodox 16.1 19.0
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 16. Percentage of citizens polled who “Agree strongly” or “Agree” that 
“A job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children.”
2008
EU 57.9
Turkey 89.1
Orthodox 77.4
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
Appendix 17. Percentage of citizens polled who “Agree strongly” or “Agree” that 
“Having a job is the best way for a woman to be an independent person.”
2008
EU 80.6
Turkey 71.8
Orthodox 86.8
Source: European Values Surveys 1999-2008.
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